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MEGAN'S LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF THE CHILD
IN THE ON-LINE AGE

Professor Nadine Strossen v. Professor Ernie Allen
Moderated by Mr. Walter Pincus
April 15, 1998
Georgetown University Law Center
PAUL KAPLAN: Good afternoon and welcome to the Third Annual American
Criminal Law Review Debate. My name is Paul Kaplan. I'm the Editor-in-Chief of
the ACLR and it's my pleasure to welcome all of you to the event this afternoon.
This debate series was inaugurated three years ago to mark the ACLR's
twenty-fifth anniversary at Georgetown, and this event is the centerpiece of our
summer issue each year. Past events have brought a number of noted and vibrant
speakers to campus, including Alan Dershowitz, Johnnie Cochran, Stephen Bright,
Akhil Amar, Judge Alex Kozinski, and the late Judge Harold Rothwax. Today we
are very pleased to add to those ranks once again.
To introduce today's participants to you, I'd like to turn over the event to the
organizer of this debate, the ACLR's Executive Editor, Robert Kwak.
ROBERT KWAK: Thank you. My name is Robert Kwak and I'm the Executive
Editor of the American CriminalLaw Review. On behalf of the Journal let me also
welcome our distinguished speakers, students, faculty, and members of the
administration to our annual debate, this year entitled "Megan's Law and the
Protection of the Child in the On-Line Age."
Before I introduce today's participants, a word about our format. Our moderator
will direct each question to one participant. He or she will have five minutes to
respond, and our other speaker will have three minutes for rebuttal. At the end of
the debate each participant will have five minutes to make a closing statement. I
now have the distinct privilege of introducing our distinguished guests.
Ernie Allen is the co-founder, president, and CEO of the National Center for
Missing & Exploited Children. Based in Arlington, the National Center is a
private, non-profit organization which has aided in the recovery of close to
thirty-nine thousand missing and abducted children. In addition, his organization
helps to train local law enforcement to combat child abduction and exploitation,
operate the child pornography tip line in cooperation with the United States Postal
Service, and has recently established the Cyber Tip Line, allowing individuals to
report incidents of child pornography and sexual exploitation through current
on-line services.
Prior to his current post, Mr. Allen worked in public service in his native
Kentucky as Director of Public Health and Safety for the city of Louisville, and
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Director of the Louisville Jefferson County Crime Commission. Mr. Allen, a
graduate of the University of Louisville and the University of Louisville School of
Law is a member of the Kentucky Bar. In addition to teaching at his alma mater, he
has held faculty positions at the University of Kentucky, Indiana University, and
has served as visiting faculty at Northeastern and the University of Wisconsin. We
are honored to have him here today.
Debating against Mr. Allen is Ms. Nadine Strossen, President of the American
Civil Liberties Union. Founded in 1920, the ACLU is considered the nation's
foremost advocate of individual rights. It has been involved in some of the most
famous and infamous litigation in our nation's history, including the Scopes
anti-evolution case, the forced relocation of Japanese-Americans during World
War 11, and most recently in overturning the Communications Decency Act. Ms.
Strossen was elected to her current position with the ACLU in 1991 after serving
as general counsel to the organization since 1986.
In addition to her duties at the ACLU, she is a professor of law at New York Law
School, where she teaches constitutional law and international human rights. She
is the author of numerous articles and books, including Defending Pornography:
Free Speech, Sex, and the Fightfor Women's Rights. A native of Minneapolis,
Professor Strossen graduated with high honors from Harvard Law School, where
she was an editor of the Law Review.
Finally, our moderator today is Walter Pincus, senior correspondent for the
Washington Post. In his four decades in journalism he has worked for a variety of
major newspapers, television networks, and has served as the Executive Editor for
the New Republic. Mr. Pincus has covered some of the most important stories of
the last half of the twentieth century for the Washington Post, including the
Watergate hearings, the hostage crisis in Iran, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the
Aldridge Ames espionage case. In 1981 he received an Emmy for writing on a
CBS News documentary series on defense of the United States.
In addition to his responsibility as a journalist, Mr. Pincus serves as a consultant
to the Washington Post Corporation, where he's helping to steer the newspaper into
the non-print ventures of television and the World Wide Web. A graduate of Yale
University, Mr. Pincus is currently a student here at Georgetown in the Law
Center's evening division. It is a pleasure to have all three participants join us
today and, without further ado, I turn the lectern over to Mr. Walter Pincus.
WALTER PINCUS: Lecturing instead of listening here: It's a new event.
In late July of 1994 a seven-year old New York girl named Megan Kanka was
abducted, raped, and murdered by a twice-convicted sex offender who, unknown
to her parents, lived just across the street with two other men who had been
convicted of sex offenses. Public outrage about Megan's murder was immediate,
intense, and inevitably political. Within two weeks New Jersey's governor and the
State General Assembly were considering bills for registration and community
notification. By October, the Governor had signed the registration and community
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notification laws, which had quickly passed both the State Senate and General
Assembly.
The horror of the event had been carried into every home in the country, by
television, by radio, and by print. The resultant fear within every household with
young children created a political wildfire. Similar laws were rapidly passed in
other states, so that by the time the first court challenge to Megan's Law reached
New Jersey's courts in 1996, forty-nine states, according to a recent Washington
Post article, had adopted similar sex offelqder registration laws, and thirty-seven
had maintained some form of community notification program.
Congress had its own version, which President Clinton signed in May of 1996.
Last year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments that Megan's Law
violated constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy and ex post facto
'punishment. Registration and notification were approved. One court decision said
the danger of recidivism requires a system of registration which will permit law
enforcement officials to identify previous offenders and alert the public, when
necessary, for public safety. It rejected the notion that the law was punitive against
convicted sex offenders. The dissenting judge, however, said it was punitive,
notwithstanding the Legislature's subjective intent to the contrary. Early this year
the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal on the New Jersey decisions. So
Megan's Law as passed, and modified by court decisions, is enforced.
We hope today through discussion and debate, to allow you to understand the
pros and cons of the laws, as well as the conflicts inherent in the implementation of
them. These are untested laws. They exist in widely different forms throughout the
country, but they were put together out of honest fears.
Not for the first time in our history will laws reduce the rights of some-in this
case, the over one hundred seventy-five thousand classified as sexual offenders-in the name of protecting others. We'll focus on various forms of notification
adopted in jurisdictions around the country, including not only distribution of
handbills, law enforcement announcements, publication of notices, but the newer
techniques of CD-ROM, the Internet, and 900 telephone numbers.
You've heard how the process will begin. I will now start with a question for Mr.
Allen.
Megan's Law statutes have been justified as a necessary means of protecting the
public from a group of individuals who may be likely to repeat their crimes. These
laws have also been attacked as a way to continue punishing offenders after
they've served their sentences. What do you say is the purpose of Megan's Law?
Do these laws protect the public or punish offenders?
ERNIE ALLEN: Mr. Pincus, these laws protect the public. That is their purpose.
They are not punitive; they are regulatory. We are dealing with a category of
offenders who represent the highest risk to the community, and particularly, to the
most vulnerable sections of the community.
Let me try to provide a little perspective. Megan's Law is one element of
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comprehensive state sex offender policy. That policy includes aggressive enforcement, prosecution, meaningful sentencing, treatment as a matter of opportunity,
not right, and then follow-up in the community for these released offenders.
Follow-up includes registration for all convicted offenders and notification for the
most serious of those offenders.
Now, a question I suppose one could ask is "why sex offenders?" Well, our view
is that sex offenders are different. We would not support, and do not support such
approaches and such legislation for auto thieves or bad check artists, but sex
offenders are different. Sex offenders create enormous fear among the public. The
nature of their act conveys a kind of psychological menace or harm. Sex offenders
prey upon the most vulnerable segments of our population.
The majority of the victims of America's sex offenders are kids, and research
has shown that a significant subset of the sex offender population represents the
highest risk of reoffense. They are coming back into our communities. Therefore,
is it not appropriate that government, as an exercise of its legitimate public purpose
of maintaining public health and safety, should provide that extra measure of
protection to communities, to people at risk?
Now, the concept is simple, and the numbers have evolved since that Washington Post article. Today, fifty states have sex offender registry laws requiring every
convicted sex offender to register their presence in the community with local law
enforcement. Today, forty-five states have enacted some version of community
notification, or Megan's Law. It is our view that these laws are not punitive.
Criminal history is already public record. However, historically, the public's not
been able to get to it and doesn't know to ask for it. This is a legitimate exercise of
state power. There is no question that there is some invasion of that convicted sex
offender's privacy, but it's important for people to understand that only the most
serious offenders are subjected to the broadest kind of public and community
notification.
The standard in the model statutes that are being enacted across the country is
that offenders are assessed based upon their level of risk. With every offender
required to register with law enforcement, only the most serious offender is subject
to community notification. We believe there is a rational basis for such distinctions
and that these laws are regulatory and not punitive. Any stigma that flows from this
notification is a product not of the registration and notification, but of the criminal
offenses for which these offenders have been convicted. Megan's Law's purpose is
to protect, not to punish.
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, certainly the purpose of all criminal laws is also to
protect, and I think it's very interesting that Mr. Allen has stressed the fact that
these laws we're discussing apply to convicted offenders. That is precisely the
basis for singling them out. I think it's an exercise in legal fiction to label as
"non-punitive" a law that clearly has a punitive effect-imposing a mark of Cain
or a scarlet letter upon one selected group of offenders who have served out their
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time, let me emphasize that.
Such a law is inconsistent with a whole range of constitutional guarantees,
including the prohibition against ex post facto or retroactive punishments and
double jeopardy. The reason why advocates of these laws strain so mightily to put
the label "regulatory" upon them is precisely to escape the constitutional guarantees that go with our criminal justice process.
Now, I want to stress, these are people who have committed very serious crimes.
The appropriate way to deal with those crimes is to prosecute them, to punish them
to the full extent of the law. If we feel that they need additional punishment, or if
we feel that they need additional treatment or rehabilitation, that has to be done
within the context of the criminal justice system.
I have to emphasize, I don't think we have to make a trade-off here between the
constitutionally-guaranteed rights of all citizens, including those who are convicted of crimes, on the one hand, and protecting our communities and our
children, on the other hand. One of the reasons why the ACLU objects to these
laws is we think they are as ineffective as they are unconstitutional. They give the
community a false sense of security; they divert resources away from constructive
measures, measures such as those that are pursued by Mr. Allen's organization to
actually prevent and educate in a more meaningful sense.
WALTER PINCUS: If I can pick it up from there, if you say the idea of community
notification doesn't work, that there is a perception that there's a high risk with
these people in the community, what's your formula for protecting people with
children?
NADINE STROSSEN: You say there's a perception of a high risk of reoffense, and
I'm glad you used the word "perception," because public perception and political
statements about the likelihood of reoffense have been grossly exaggerated. The
National Center for Institutions and Alternatives has recently released a study that
reviews the meta-analyses that have been done of recidivism rates. The recidivism
rates of sex offenders are actually quite low, and lower than those of any offenders
other than murder. I say that because we are going down a slippery slope here. If
the rationale that is asserted for imposing additional punishments on sex offenders,
including registration and prolonged incarceration, if those rationales are based on
a notion of likelihood or possibility of committing crimes again, then I think we are
talking about a radical change in our entire criminal justice system.
Now, what do I propose we do that would provide meaningful and constitutionally acceptable protection for our communities, which they certainly deserve? One
approach is, as I already indicated, to use the criminal justice system. There is no
reason why legislatures cannot extend the amount of incarceration, cannot enact
habitual offender statutes so that repeat offenders would be subject to longer
incarceration.
Most importantly, the professionals who work with sex offenders have argued
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that there are many treatment modalities that offer great promise. Unfortunately,
only a tiny percentage of people who are convicted of sex offenses now are
receiving any kind of treatment or rehabilitation while they are incarcerated. You
know, to release them to the community and to say, "Well, we're going to warn
you about this person who is still dangerous, but we're not going to do anything to
treat that person, either within prison or outside of prison," that's like just telling
the community that we've got a poisoned water supply. We're notifying you about
it, but we're not doing anything to deal with the underlying harm.
So, that's what I would say in terms of the perpetrators-let's treat them, let's
incarcerate them, but let's not pretend that we are releasing them and then in fact
continue life-long punishment in one fashion or another.
From the perspective of children and others in our society, how do we
meaningfully protect them? Unfortunately, it's not by notifying them of the tiny
percentage of sex offenders who have actually been convicted and released. Every
study shows, sadly, tragically, that about eighty percent of all sex offenses,
including against children, are committed not by strangers, not by people who have
been convicted and released, but rather by people who have never been arrested or
prosecuted, and who are even within their own families. Unfortunately, it is a sad
reality that if we want our children to be safe, we have to educate them about the
dangers of sex abuse, we have to warn them against contact, unwanted contact,
with every adult, including those-indeed, particularly those-that they know and
trust.

And here is something where I know from having read information from Mr.
Allen's fine organization: they agree. They have argued that it gives a false sense of
security to focus on stranger danger rather than comprehensive programs of
educating all children and all parents, through the homes and through the schools,
about exercising caution when dealing with any adult, regardless of whether you
have been specifically warned about that particular person.
ERNIE ALLEN: Let me briefly rebut. I agree with a lot of that. Certainly I agree
with the premise that the stranger danger aspect is a myth, and you are right,
Professor Strossen. However, it's important to note that even though seventy to
ninety percent of those who prey upon children are not strangers in the eye and the
mind of the child, neither are they necessarily family members. HHS research
established that only one-third to one-half of sexual abuse cases against girls are
perpetrated by family members and only ten to twenty percent of those against
boys. Jesse Timmendequas was not a pure stranger to Megan Kanka. He was her
neighbor. This whole premise of the risk to kids from people they know is one of
the key reasons why Megan's Law is so important. It's one of the key reasons why
we need to know the people who are coming into day-care centers and working in
schools and living on the block.
Second, and I don't mean to get into a statistical quarrel, but let me respond
briefly on the issue of recidivism and on the issue of extent of the problem. Justice
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Department data indicate that six out of every ten convicted child molesters has a
prior conviction, prior history. One out of every four has a history of violent sexual
offenses. Forty-eight percent of convicted sex offenders in America's prisons will
be arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years of their release.
Of the quarter of a million sex offenders currently under the care and control of
correctional agencies in the United States, sixty percent of them today are in the
community, and virtually all of them are coming back to the community. The
reality is Megan's Law is not a panacea. But don't we owe that little extra measure
of protection and information to families potentially faced with an offender who
could represent a threat to them and their child and their community? Again,
Megan's Law focuses only on the most serious risks, not on everybody.
WALTER PINCUS: States define "sex offender" in various ways. For example,
under some state statutes "sex offender" is defined as any individual who commits
sexual assault or endangers the welfare of the child. Other statutes include within
their definition individuals convicted of consensual sodomy. Who should define
what offenders are covered by Megan's Law? What should the definition be?
ERNIE ALLEN: Mr. Pincus, the answer to who should define it is the legislative
body of each individual state, under our Tenth Amendment premise of leaving
those decisions to them. Now, we share the concerns and the implications of your
question. I think it's important to understand that Megan's Law is new law. Most
states have enacted these statutes within the past two years, and one of the great
problems, as you indicated in your introductory remarks, is the lack of uniformity.
We, as an organization, are working very hard to try to bring about greater
uniformity and greater consistency from state to state. There are federal guidelines.
Congress provides guidelines for states in terms of what the covered offenses
should be. And clearly we think those offenses should be proscribed sexual
offenses against children, including kidnapping and false imprisonment, criminal
sexual conduct, solicitation of a minor for a sexual performance, for prostitution
and rape and those offenses that speak to sexually-violent predators.
However, even with those kinds of statutory inconsistencies and the current
problems we face, I think it's important to focus on the processes that are
developing and that a lot of us are arguing need to be in place. For example, there
are some model states, Minnesota is one, Washington State is one, that have
established levels of risk. That process begins with an end-of-sentence review
panel in which a multi-disciplinary group of professionals, including corrections
and mental health professionals, take a look at the totality of the issues affecting
this particular offender.
They look at his prior history. They look at the nature of the offenses, the age of
his victims, any violence associated with it. They look at the prospects and the
risks associated with reoffense. They look at offender characteristics, whether he
has participated in treatment, how he's performed in prison. They look at whether
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he has community supports and resources, whether he has neighborhood or family
or other kinds of employment prospects when he gets out. They look at what he
says, and an astounding, an alarming number of these offenders say, "Yeah, if you
let me go, I may do it again; I'm not sure I can control my behavior." They look at
personal traits and characteristics like age and whether he has debilitating illnesses
that affect that release decision.
Based upon that process, and this is one that we think ought to be in place across
America, they make a judgment, they assign a rating that determines this
offender's level of risk. The low-risk offenders are subject only to the registration
requirement. They register their presence with law enforcement in that community.
The moderate-risk offenders are subject to notification only in a very targeted way:
to schools, to community organizations, but not in a public sense. And only the
highest risk, or level three offenders, are subject to the broadest kind of notification.
We think that is a model that works. All sex offenders are not alike. It's a way to
minimize the potential intrusion on a sex offender's privacy. And my response to
your question, Mr. Pincus, in the circumstance that you cite in which consenting
adult statutes would be included on this list under this process is that, it is virtually
inconceivable that community notification would be made in such a case.
We'd like to see greater uniformity. We don't see the need for those kinds of
statutes to be in play. But even with them, these processes are very unlikely to
intrude on the individual privacy of those offenders, other than requiring them to
register with law enforcement.
WALTER PINCUS: If I can add one point to that, New Jersey has registration
every three months for fifteen years. Is that a rational approach?
ERNIE ALLEN: I think one of the risks is we don't want to create such a massive
bureaucracy that the bureaucracy impedes on common sense. I think every three
months is probably too frequent.
Now, let me say we think, frankly, that the California registration law has some
merit, which is a lifetime registration law. Most of the new laws are ten-year
requirements for registration with the potential to challenge or revisit. The reason
we think that's so important is that recidivism and treatment research indicates that
for a certain category of offender, for the traditional pedophile offender, this is a
life-long problem. They may not re-offend periodically, but treatment research
shows that even when an offender is caught and prosecuted at a youthful age and
treated, there is still a propensity for that behavior to appear far later in life.
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, that shows the ongoing importance of treatment, and
it seems to me by branding somebody as a pariah, you are very likely-as all
mental health organizations have pointed out in testifying against this law-you
are very likely to drive that person away from treatment, away from the kind of
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family support structure, away from the kind of job support structure that is most
likely to increase that person's chances of reintegrating productively into society.
I think it's quite ironic that Mr. Allen cites the three states that he mentioned as
models of how this process of supposedly selecting the most dangerous offenders
is working. The three states he mentioned are California, Minnesota, and Washington. The actual experiences in those states, I think, afford us no ground for
celebration in terms of human rights-and that means both the human rights of the
convicted offender who has served his time and the human right to safety for the
rest of us.
Take California, for example. In California, for the first two years that its
revamped version of Megan's Law was in effect (I say "revamped" because
California has had sex offender registration since the 1940s), it was enforced upon
everybody who had ever been convicted of any sex offense, including consensual
sodomy between adults, including statutory rape, at a time that the laws on those
subjects were still in effect, even though those acts are not crimes now. People who
were convicted back in the 1940s and '50s, including in sting operations against
gay men, have had to register and have been subject to community notification.
Many of them have had their lives destroyed, their marriages destroyed, and finally
came to the ACLU. Fortunately, we were able to persuade the California legislature to amend the law.
But that's not an aberration. The Third Circuit case that's been alluded to from
New Jersey involved a man named Alexander Artway. His conviction was for
having consensual sodomy with an adult woman. At the time that had happened,
many years ago, that was a crime in New Jersey. So, you know, it reminds me a
little bit of Justice Potter Stewart's famous epigram about pornography: "I may not
be able to define it, but I know it when I see it." Well, these states are each seeing a
different "it" in terms of sexual offenses that they consider so heinous and so
dangerous that they are subjecting people who were convicted of those crimesincluding many, many years ago-to lifelong registration and notification procedures.
In terms of being able to predict who is the most dangerous, the professional
literature indicates that even the best trained experts are wrong most of the time,
more than fifty percent of the time. Worse yet, in New Jersey, for example, it is the
prosecutor who is deemed to be an expert. And let me submit to you, no matter
who is making that determination, there is such an enormous incentive to find
anybody being evaluated-who, after all, by definition, has been convicted of a
heinous sex crime-there is such an enormous pressure not to release that person
without some kind of notification. I'm not surprised by what's happened in my
state of New York, and I think it's typical, it's going to happen everywhere: that the
vast, vast, vast majority of all sex offenders are labeled as the highest category of
risk.
WALTER PINCUS: Accepting the fact that you don't believe in notification in
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these cases, the fact is we have a law. Define what you would like to see done,
given the fact that there is registration, and notification becomes a second part of it.
What's the least restrictive way to enforce the kinds of laws that clearly the public
wants on the books?
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, the least restrictive would obviously be registration
only with police, and in fact, the ACLU has not opposed those kinds of registration
requirements, so long as there are certain basic procedural protections, such as
making sure that you've got the right person and making sure that you are not
talking about offenses such as consensual sodomy. In fact, the purpose of the
registration statutes that have existed for a while, including the one in California,
was to aid law enforcement officers in monitoring and, in the worst-case scenario,
if there actually is a crime, to look for a likely offender.
The difference with the community notification is that it removes or displaces
responsibility from law enforcement into citizens' hands. This is a plain call for
vigilante "justice." That's an oxymoron, of course. And in every state in which
we've had community notification, there have been tragic instances of vigilantism-in some cases, misdirected against somebody who turned out not even to
have been a convicted sex offender.
If forced to choose the least intrusive kind of notification, I would say it's one
aspect of what California now has, which is a 900 number that you can access to
seek information about a particular person only under two conditions. One is that
you specifically identify that person. In other words, this is not a dragnet request
for information. You give that person's name, address, and other identifying
characteristics. Second, and even more importantly, you identify a particular
reason why you have a focused safety concern. For example, "I'm thinking about
hiring this person as a babysitter to take care of my children in our home." I think
that kind of notification is the least intrusive and also the most effective.
I keep submitting, as a constant theme of my remarks, that we don't have to
make a tradeoff between protecting rights of people convicted of crime and who
have served their time, on the one hand, and on the other hand protecting the
community, because I believe other kinds of notification (that go beyond the "least
intrusive" California approach I just described) are ineffective.
On the one hand you could have vary targeted notification, right? You could
notify people who live in the immediate surroundings of the released sex offender.
That means people who live beyond the immediate surroundings could potentially
be easy targets, under the rationale for this law, right? Because they're not going to
be on particular notice about this person. At the other end of the spectrum, the more
widely dispersed you make the notice, the less impact it has in another sense,
because how are the recipients going to be able to sort through all of the
information? Depending on how wide the notice is, you are going to be driving the
convicted sex offenders out of particular communities into other communities
where there either will not be any notice at all or it will be part of such a huge list of
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names that the notice is going to be meaningless. Which brings me full circle to a
point I started with, which is that the only meaningful protection is to be on your
guard against everybody who engages in inappropriate conduct.
ERNIE ALLEN: A couple of brief responses. First of all, on the California issue,
we do not recommend California as the model, and in fact, our view is that the
model for community notification is a state that allows some basic active
notification. California, right now, only has a passive notification system, which
allows people to query a 900 number or a CD-ROM disc or a database of registered
offenders. The California law is fifty years old and is lifetime registration in terms
of Mr. Pincus's point about a ten or fifteen-year life span of such a requirement.
We don't agree on the point, however, about the other models. One of the points
you made about targeting the notification, frankly, we support that. The Minnesota
law, for example, talks about the issue of "likely to encounter." We think it does
make sense, on the basis of this levels of risk process, to target where you're going
to provide the information, to target those people most likely to come into contact
with this particular offender, meaning the neighborhood in which he lives, the area
in which he works. We would like to preserve the ability to do broader notification
with the most serious offenders. But I think there is a continuum here. There are a
range of responses, including community-based treatment availability for youthful
offenders or offenders who are non-violent first offenders, registration for all
convicted offenders, and then targeted notification for those offenders who present
the highest risk.
WALTER PINCUS: Ms. Strossen, in her response, brought up this question of the
effect that notification has in a negative way. In Washington State, for example, a
child rapist's house is burned down before he is to be released from prison, and
there are other examples. A Texas man who was released from prison after serving
eleven years for a girl's murder is driven out of six towns, denied entry to more
than two hundred halfway houses. How do you answer that particular criticism,
that the statutes provoke vigilante action.., harassment?
ERNIE ALLEN: I respond in two ways. Obviously, vigilante violence and
harassment are outrageous, should not be tolerated, and it's the obligation of law
enforcement, the obligation of the state to deal with them, to prosecute those who
violate the laws. Burning down somebody's house is just as unlawful if the
occupant is a convicted sex offender as if he were anybody else. However,
opponents of these laws have waved the bloody shirt from the beginning. They
prophesied chaos and violence and all kinds of disruption. Well, the first Megan's
Law, four years before Megan Kanka was murdered, was the Washington State law
passed in 1990. There is at least, as a result of the research from the Washington
State Institute of Public Policy, six years' worth of tracking data. Let me illustrate
that data just to show a couple of points. During that six-year period, there were
nearly ten thousand sex offenders who were registered sex offenders in the state of

1330

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1319

Washington. Of that group, roughly nine hundred forty were subject to community
notification, level two and level three, about two-thirds of their notifications were
just to schools and community groups, three hundred twenty-seven of them were
more broad-based community notification. Of that number there were thirty-three
reported incidents of harassment. Now, that's terrible, there shouldn't be any. But
thirty-three is barely three percent of the total number of offenders who were
subject to community notification during those six years in the State of Washington.
Of everybody subject to community notification-ten thousand registered sex
offenders---only nine hundred forty were deemed, through the process in the State
of Washington, to be appropriate for notification to the community, only three
hundred twenty-seven viewed as the highest-risk offenders. So, this is not a law
where everybody is being exposed and everybody is being subjected. Vigilantism
should not be tolerated. We don't support it, nobody supports it, and we need to
make sure it doesn't happen.
One other quick point, Mr. Pincus. One of the reasons for the success of the
Washington State program and the other programs in terms of minimizing the
incidents of vigilantism is that those programs have community meetings, they go
to the community to have discussions before the offender is ever released. They
answer the questions, they tell people in the affected community who is coming
into the community, what their history is. The message is, people can deal with it,
they can assimilate the information, they can use it to say to their children, "Avoid
where this guy lives." If the Kankas had known that, Megan would probably not
have gone into her neighbor's house and been victimized. So, vigilantism has not
been the level of problem that is prophesied, but we still shouldn't tolerate it.
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, it's interesting that Mr. Allen talks about the success
of the Washington program and cites the Washington State Institute of Public
Policy review. I'm familiar with that study too, which also shows that there is no
positive impact in reducing sex crimes or recidivism as a result of this law. So, it
may be successful in slightly reducing the incidents of vigilantism, but it's not
successful in terms of its avowed purpose, which is to provide greater protection to
the community.
I think there's a double standard here too when we say, as Mr. Allen and others
have said, that to save the life of even one child it is worth whatever the downsides
are of this law. Certainly, I put infinite value on the life of any human being. But
that also includes human beings who are accused of crime and convicted of
crime-or falsely believed to have been convicted of crime, because some of the
victims of vigilantism have been completely innocent. They have been victims of
mistaken identity.
You know, there's also harassment in addition to the most flagrant examples of
houses being burned and people being physically assaulted. There's a lower level
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of harassment here that is extremely pernicious, in terms of community safety as
well as concerns about the released sex offender, who is being ostracized, being
isolated, being denied jobs, being denied a place to live. This is going to drive these
people underground. According to the psychological experts, it's going to minimize rather than maximize the chance that they will seek treatment, the chance that
they will be safely reintegrated into our communities.
One other thing I'd like to point out in this vein: the State of California, which
has the longest experience with sex registration, is completely unable to keep track
of about eighty percent of all people who are supposedly registered, as a result of
the notification requirement. Notification is going to decrease the likelihood that
somebody is going to register and face the ostracism or vigilantism or worse, and
therefore, the public safety rationale of the law is undermined.
WALTER PINCUS: I want to move on to a slightly different part of the same
subject. In Hendricks v. Kansas, the Supreme Court upheld that State's law which
allowed sex offenders to be committed to psychiatric institutions at the end of their
prison terms. If a convicted criminal is released from prison, has a mental disorder
rendering him dangerous to himself or others, he can be civilly confined to a
mental institution by his family or the state. What is wrong with doing this in the
context of sex offenders?
NADINE STROSSEN: Kansas v. Hendricks was a terrible decision and I'm glad I
have an opportunity to comment on it, because I think it hasn't received nearly the
public attention and concern that it should. What is being talked about is not our
ordinary processes of civil commitment, which the Supreme Court previously has
upheld. The constitutional requirements are: Number one, somebody has to be
mentally ill, that is, have a dysfunction that is subject to treatment. Number two, he
must be a danger to himself or others. Then the rationale for involuntary
commitment is both to protect that person from himself and to protect the
community by providing treatment, which maximizes the likelihood that this
person is going to be rehabilitated.
That is not at all the rationale of the Kansas law or of the others that the Supreme
Court has now validated. In fact, the Kansas law's legislative history, along with
other such statutes, precisely says, because this person cannot be institutionalized
pursuant to our normal civil commitment procedures, we have to come up with a
new approach. Also, this person cannot be subject to criminal punishment, because
by definition he has already completely served out his sentence. Therefore, we are
going to come up with a brand new term, not at all recognized by mental health
professionals-namely, a "mental disorder" or "abnormality."
As experts testified-again, I want to cite the mental health organizations that
uniformly opposed this kind of law-it's a circular definition. You basically say,
the evidence of abnormality is that he's committed a crime in the past and therefore
we are going to put him away, essentially for life, indefinitely. The reason I say
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"essentially for life" is that he is put away until or unless the fact-finder, the judge,
determines that this person is no longer a threat to the community. To make matters
worse, in the Hendricks case, the individual was put away in a state prison facility
where he was not offered any treatment at all.
Now the reason I say this case is so profoundly dangerous to our notion of
liberty, our notion of justice, our notion of the purposes of the mental health system
on the one hand and the prison system on the other hand, is that this is nothing
short of shades of the Soviet gulag: using psychiatric hospitals as places to put
away people who are deemed to be undesirable or dangerous for various reasons.
Again, I want to emphasize that if somebody is truly mentally ill and can be
treated and is a danger, that person should be subject to the civil commitment
procedures that already exist in Kansas and in other states. But let's not put a
veneer, a rationale, a euphemism of some kind of mental health purpose onto a
procedure that is in fact nothing but prolonged incarceration for the purpose of
punishment and specific deterrence, removing a social undesirable from our midst,
merely on the prediction of future dangerousness-a very dangerous legal fiction.
ERNIE ALLEN: Prior history many times is a very good predictor of future
behavior. The reality is Leroy Hendricks has a lifetime of offending children.
Leroy Hendricks has been in and out of prison his whole life and this issue is
bigger than Leroy Hendricks. But let's just focus on him.
There's no question. Leroy Hendricks was a pedophile. Leroy Hendricks said,
"If you let me go, I'm probably going to do it again; when I get under stress, this is
what I do." The reality is, the purpose of civil commitment is exactly as Professor
Strossen articulated, it is to deal with someone who has an uncontrollable
behavioral problem, as a result of mental illness or mental abnormality, who
represents a danger to himself and others, who has a prior history of sexually
violent pathology, sexual violent criminality, and you address the issue of does that
person represent a threat to the community?
The fact that he has completed his sentence, in our view and in the Court's view,
does not make it punitive. It doesn't meet the test. The traditional test of
punishment is not met. It is not retribution because his prior criminal history is
only used for evidentiary purposes. It's not deterrence, because if he's truly
mentally ill or has a mental abnormality, the threat of commitment isn't going to
deter future behavior. The issue here is, is this the sort of thing that can be done to
protect the community in a very narrow slice of cases? Now, Professor Strossen
talked about the controversy within the mental health community. I think it's
important to note that the American Psychiatric Association views pedophilia as a'
condition-a mental condition-and that it is a prescribed condition in the DSM-4,
the Diagnostic Manual.
WALTER PINCUS: Let me go on to just fill out one part of this. If we accept the
Kansas view that the way they're recommitting people is to provide treatment to
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sex offenders, shouldn't that treatment have taken place during their prison
sentence, at the same time?
ERNIE ALLEN: We support treatment in the prison setting, we support treatment
post-release, we support it in the community for low-risk non-violent offenders.
My answer to your question is "yes." However, I think within the context that the
court looked at this there are two primary purposes. The primary purpose of this
civil commitment statute is to protect the community.
The second purpose is treatment. Now, one of the tough issues here is, what if
you cannot successfully treat this sort of offender? Well, my argument would be,
and I think there are lots of examples in the law and in public policy on this point,
that the absence of a cure or the absence of a successful intervention or treatment
doesn't necessarily obviate the desirability to commit the particular person. If
there's some kind of dread virus and you need to quarantine someone to avoid it,
they're infecting everybody else, would you say, "We don't have a cure for this;
we don't have a silver bullet for this; we'll just have to let you go?" I think the
point is very basic here.
Now, in the Hendricks decision, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the key point
that he made, was that this cannot be and should not be used to correct the results
of inadequate sentencing, to modify the product of the criminal justice process. In
our view, civil commitment should be used rarely and only for the most dangerous
offenders. Again, if you look at this continuum of offenders, these offenders should
be more dangerous than the high-risk offenders for community notification under
Megan's Law.
One final point here is that this is not retribution, and Professor Strossen makes
the point about being housed or committed within the prison facility. The model
for these, and now nine states have them, and even Mr. Hendricks was not under
the control of the state corrections agency, these offenders should be housed in the
same sort of settings as other civilly committed individuals under the control of
mental health systems or social services systems, and every effort should be made

to treat within the limits of available treatment. These laws provide for annual
reviews in order to assess their progress through treatment. The mere absence of a
cure or successful treatment we don't think obviates the need or the appropriateness to have a civil commitment availability for these kinds of high-risk offenders.
NADINE STROSSEN: I'm not arguing, nor are the mental health professionals,
including the American Psychiatric Association, which also opposed this (Mr.
Allen cited it, so I want to underscore that), none of us is arguing that the absence
of a cure is the problem here. To the contrary, we are arguing that it's the absence of
a mental illness that is a problem. Kansas acknowledged in its law's legislative
history that there is no mental illness here, so we're going to come up with this
other new-fangled term: "disorder." Yes, it is true that pedophilia, along with
alcoholism, along with too much caffeine, a whole lot of things that a lot of people
do, are classified as disorders, but that is certainly not the same as a mental illness.
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I think there are a lot of dangers to community safety, as well as individual
rights, if we blur the distinguishing rationales that to this point had existed between
the civil commitment system for mentally ill people and the criminal justice
system for people who have been adjudicated guilty of having committed a
criminal act in the past. The danger is that we are now moving toward a system of
massive preventive detention. That is, because of an admittedly inexact, speculative prediction that a particular person is likely to commit a crime in the future, that
somehow is deemed enough to detain this person forever.
It is also a diversion of resources from treating people who are actually mentally
ill, and that is one of the reasons why mental health professionals oppose this.
WALTER PINCUS: I want to move on now to a new sort of area, that is
"communications decency acts" that have been introduced in the Congress. The
protection of children is not limited to just Megan's Law statutes. What's the most
effective way to protect children from on-line dangers?
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, there are two kinds of on-line dangers. First, through
on-line communications a child can actually be targeted for some kind of contact,
including criminal contact, in the three-dimensional, real world. Here I really want
to congratulate the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, which has
worked very effectively with the FBI, in using existing law enforcement authority
and existing investigative approaches to find those people who are in fact using the
Internet, as they have used other communications media in the past, to try to
develop exploitative relations with, or to endanger, actual children. So we need to
continue to devote law enforcement resources to actual prosecution of those who
victimize actual children.
What parents have to do in this new medium is the "same old same old,"-to
give their children the same kinds of warnings that they had given in previous
contexts: "Don't talk to strangers; don't give out your home address; never agree
to meet a stranger." It's very, very important that parents be educated and that
children be educated about the dangers of actual contacts that can begin in an
on-line environment.
The second kind of danger that is said to threaten children from on-line activities
is the supposed harm that results from exposure to expression, to ideas, to
depictions, and to words. Most concerns seem to be about sexually-oriented
expression. Violence is also a concern. These are the same kinds of expression that
many parents have not wanted their children to view in more traditional media.
And here again, our response is, use in the present the same tried-and-true
tactics that have been used in the past. As a parent you want to maintain, certainly
when you're dealing with a young child-I think the older the young person
becomes, the more independent he or she is and as the Supreme Court has
recognized, begins to have free-speech rights and autonomy of his or her
own-but certainly when their children are at a young age, parents have a
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constitutional right, as well as a responsibility, to shield the education and
upbringing of their children, and they should monitor what their children do
on-line.
Parents are certainly also free to choose to install any of the freely available
software programs that screen out certain materials. Here, the ACLU's concern is
that much of that software is extremely overbroad and misleading when it tells
parents that all that's going to be filtered out is, for example, hard-core pornography; yet surveys continue to show that many of these software programs, in fact,
filter out much valuable information that many concerned parents would want their
children to have access to. Many of them screen out any reference whatsoever to
any sexually-oriented material, even if it's artistic, even if it's got very serious
value.
Last, let me say I think rather than negatively blocking or blacklisting certain
materials that are deemed to be dangerous, we should instead use the same kind of
affirmative approach that has worked in other media, empowering parents and
children themselves to make affirmative selections of materials that they consider
to be particularly valuable or useful. The American Library Association has always
given recommendations and guidelines of books that are particularly educationally
valuable for children of various ages. They're now performing an analogous
function on-line.
ERNIE ALLEN: I agree.
(Laughter)
WALTER PINCUS: Some of the recent...
NADINE STROSSEN: May I use his time?
(Laughter)
WALTER PINCUS: Some of the recent legislation that's been introduced in
Congress take two different ways of approaching the problem. One is limiting
access by sexual offenders to the Internet, while another seeks to protect children
from material, just sexually-explicit material that's on-line. To what extent should
the responsibility be left primarily to the parents, but most importantly, what
should be the role of the state?
ERNIE ALLEN: Well, as Professor Strossen indicated, we certainly think the role
of the parent is very key and very important. Our organization, now for four years,
has been promulgating and disseminating information to help parents catch up to
this technological age and emphasizing the role of parenting, talking to your kids,
finding out what your kids are involved in. We also share and support the notion of
development of technology access tools and controls. Probably the one point I do
want to elaborate on that she raised is the whole issue of overbroad control in terms
of access to content. I think much of that is going to be a function of evolving
technology, technology software tools, access controls that don't just block out

1336

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1319

words but can now deny access to children by Web address, by URL. That
evolution of technology, I think, will help us address this problem.
We do think that there's a significant role for the state, and that role is primarily
in the area of enforcement. Professor Strossen mentioned this. I think one of the
important things that came from the Reno decision is the reaffirmation by the Court
that child pornography and obscenity, wherever they are, including cyberspace, is
unlawful-in the adult bookstore, in the mails, in the shopping mall, or on the
Internet.
What that means is that the state has to do a better job of catching up. You know,
law enforcement in many ways is still in the horse-and-buggy days. It does not
have the technology access and the tools to really deal with the misuse of the
Internet. One of the things that we've certainly seen since the Ferberdecision in
the 1980's on child pornography-which said that child pornography is not
protected speech, it's child abuse-is that that decision forced child pornography
out of the adult bookstores. The United States Postal Service has cracked down on
the use of the mails, and what we've seen is a sense of the Internet, or cyberspace,
as a sanctuary for pedophiles who feel that they can operate with anonymity, that
they can disseminate and distribute unlawful images, non-protected speech..
Law enforcement is catching up. Since the "Innocent Images" task force at the
FBI and the Customs Service initiative, there are now more than four hundred
convictions in the past two years. In the concurrence and the dissent to the Reno v.
ACLU case, I thought some very important points were made: Technology will
evolve. There's a fundamental challenge here and the challenge is that in the
physical world you can zone areas where kids can't go and reach content. In the
world of cyberspace you can't do that without also denying adults access to what is
adult-allowable or appropriate information. As technology evolves through the
development of gateways and other technology tools, one of the roles of the state
that we see in the future and in partnership with the private industry is the
development of zoning-type applications on the Internet. Clearly we need to deal
more effectively with that content which is unlawful, but even with content that is
protected speech. That's a challenge.
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, I'm glad that Mr. Allen referred to one of my favorite
Supreme Court decisions, Reno v. ACLU! It gives me an opportunity to say that the

ACLU did not challenge in that case the aspects of the Communications Decency
Act that simply carried forward into the on-line environment prohibitions on
expression that are already illegal in other kinds of communications medianamely, obscenity, child pornography, or threatening or harassing expression. But,
to the extent it went beyond that, criminalizing "indecent" and "patently offensive" expression, we think it was a tragic diversion of resources, scarce law
enforcement resources, from prosecution of actual on-line stalkers and those who
actually abuse and exploit children.
I saw testimony that Mr. Allen gave, along with Louis Freeh, the Director of the
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FBI, in the Senate last month (March, 1998) and they were talking about how they
don't yet have enough resources to get enough computers to do enough training of
state and local law enforcement authorities all over the country to protect actual
children from actual crimes. That's because Congress, as well as state and local
governments, are busily drafting and passing unconstitutional laws that go beyond
obscenity and child pornography and criminalize "indecent" or "patently offensive" expression, notwithstanding our victory in the Supreme Court, as well as in a
number of lower federal courts around the country.
So, for those of us who really care about protecting actual children, there is
another reason to oppose censorial measures that continue to be aimed at the
Internet at every level of government. That is, the waste of time and the waste of
resources. That money should be going instead to the National Center for Missing
& Exploited Children and to actual law enforcement.
WALTER PINCUS: Can you define what you would see as a constitutional law
that deals with the problem of pornography in cyberspace?
NADINE STROSSEN: Well, I have to say I question what the "problem" of
pornography in cyberspace is. Pornography is just sexually-oriented expression.
Pornography by definition is constitutionally protected expression. Not all sexuallyoriented expression falls within the category of "obscenity," which the Supreme
Court has carved out and said this relatively narrow category is not going to
receive constitutional protection. Among other things, obscenity has to lack
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. So, when you go beyond that
and talk about pornography, by definition, you are talking about constitutionally
protected expression. And even concerning unprotected obscenity, recall Justice
Potter Stewart's famous "definition": "I cannot define it, but I know it when I see
it."
Our clients in Reno v. ACLU, which the government admitted would all be
subject to criminal prosecution under the Communications Decency Act, included
such hard-core pornographers as Planned Parenthood of America, Human Rights
Watch, and my favorite, the National High School Journalism Educators Association. Why? Because they gave information about sex, because they used some
graphic images or vulgar language.
There are many parents who think it is important for their kids to have access to
that information. But, there seems to be such a presumption that if it has to do with
sex, if you can slap that "p" word, which is an epithet, on it-"pornography"then it must be harmful to minors. Well, the government didn't put in any evidence
that any of that material that they sought to criminalize could be harmful to any
minors. Conversely, we put in evidence that much of that material would be
affirmatively beneficial-indeed, even life-saving, to minors. When you consider
the tragic spread of HIV and other STD's among teenagers, the record-breaking
numbers of unwanted teen pregnancies, and of lesbian and gay teenagers who
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commit suicide, then you have to recognize that the kinds of information and
opportunity to exchange with others that some of our clients provided on-line, far
from endangering teens' welfare, would be positive to their welfare.
The bottom line for us, as in every other situation, is individual freedom of
choice on the part of consenting adults. And with respect to families, it is a family
matter to decide, consistent with their own values and educational priorities and
views about sexuality, and their other views about morality and religion and so
forth. They should decide what their children should have access to. It is none of
the government's business.
ERNIE ALLEN: Just briefly-and I certainly will not attempt to defend the
classification of the category of indecent speech as proposed by the Communications Decency Act, the Court said it was overbroad. I think the case was well made
by the ACLU and others. However, a hundred million people are on the Internet
today. The numbers of people of the Internet have doubled every 100 days. The
capacity, the volume, the numbers of users have grown exponentially, unparalleled
in American history. The challenge is most American families don't have a clue
what their kids are doing on the computer. There's a false sense of security, there's
a sense that my kid's in his own room, he's doing something good for his future,
he's not out there where he's at risk. Kids are making those decisions, parents
aren't making those decisions. And while I completely support the point that we
need to emphasize parental responsibility, get parents involved in their kid's lives,
it is not enough to say "families need to make those decisions and let's let kids
fend for themselves." There are risks. We need to strengthen the protections for
kids on-line, and the CDA might not have been the best way to do it, but we need a
real dialogue to address these problems because kids are being harmed.
WALTER PINCUS: It's time for our summary and Professor Strossen, you go first.
NADINE STROSSEN: I'd like to end where I began. It posits a false choice to
suggest that we have to choose between, on the one hand, safety for our children
and safety for our communities, and, on the other hand, civil liberties.
Conversely, I would argue that the kinds of laws that we oppose-Megan's Law,
the Kansas so-called "civil commitment" statute, the Communications Decency
Act-these laws not only violate civil liberties of adults, not to mention civil
liberties of minors, but also are ineffective in actually advancing safety for children
and adults in our communities. They are ineffective because they are merely
symbolic. They are pandering to public fears. They are creating scapegoats. They
are allowing politicians to say, "I care about children; I'm doing something for
children." In fact, they are at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive.
I've explained to you why Megan's Law is ineffective, giving us a false sense of
security. It is counter-productive because it diverts resources from more constructive measures. I don't think that the diversion of resources issue here is at all a
trivial one. As a result of procedural due process protections that the courts have
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(correctly) insisted upon, and that indeed I heard Mr. Allen advocate, tremendous
amounts of resources are going into an inevitably unsuccessful and futile attempt
to predict which particular person in the future is going to pose a high risk of
danger.
In New Jersey, for example, every single prosecutor's office has to deputize one
prosecutor full-time to do nothing but handle classification hearings under Megan's
Law. Likewise, one judge in every jurisdiction has to do that. Meanwhile, the
statistics about the number of arrests that are made-let alone successful prosecutions and convictions--of those who commit actual crimes, are frighteningly low.
We can't afford this dangerous diversion of resources.
And, I also want to emphasize that what we're talking about here are not only
the rights and welfare of adults, but also the rights and welfare of children. If we
turn to the on-line aspect of our debate, I think it's important to note that the
Supreme Court many years ago said constitutional rights do not magically spring
into being when somebody happens to attain the state-defined age of majority.
Young people have been pioneers in using the Internet. I think we talk too often
about the potential dangers lurking out there in cyberspace and we don't talk often
enough about the wonderfully positive, liberating, enlightening, and empowering
aspects of1the Internet for young people. So, let's not deny them of the educational
and other benefits through censorship.
I like to say that the ACLU is a pro-family organization. We simply don't
believe that Big Brother is an appropriate member of "the traditional American
family." So we would like to rest protection of families and children where it
belongs-in their own hands, through education and through prevention; not
through scapegoating, not through stigmatizing, not through depriving anybody of
rights. Public safety and civil liberties can go hand-in-hand under our Constitution.
Thank you.
WALTER PINCUS: Mr. Allen
ERNIE ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Pincus. You may be shocked to hear this, but for
one two-hour period on PBS, Professor Strossen and I were man and wife, and I
think PBS thought that would be amusing and create some interesting conflict. But
during that session, Arthur Miller, the moderator, came to me after we'd engaged
in some particularly heated exchange, and said "are you still proud of her?" I made
some kind of smart-aleck retort, but basically, I said, "Yes." I think it's important
to note that I am glad that she does what she does and I'm glad that there's an
ACLU. We at the Center and other child advocates are fiercely pro-Constitution.
We believe in privacy rights. We believe in due process. We are not in favor of
trashing the Constitution for any reason. I think the differences between Professor
Strossen and me are very basic. They're about limits and they're about balance.
Our view is that these freedoms are not absolute. Our view is that in the case of
convicted offenders who've established a pattern of behavior and who represent a
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threat to the public-that it is not unreasonable to limit their privacy rights a little
bit, to carve away in the more compelling public interest.
Let me talk about that balance. I'm glad the ACLU defends the rights of
convicted child molesters and others, that they defend and advocate for the rights
of the most difficult to advocate and the most difficult to defend. But there's
balance in play here. Let me try to show you briefly what's at stake, balanced
against the privacy rights of a convicted child molester. Sixty-one percent of the
rape victims in America are less than eighteen, twenty-nine percent less than
eleven. A majority of the victims of sex offenses in America are kids. Two-thirds of
the sex offenders in American prisons today committed their offenses against
children. We talked about the California sex offender registry. There are seventy
thousand registered sex offenders in California today. I asked the Attorney General
of California how many of them were convicted of offenses against kids. The
answer is sixty-one percent of them. And another eighteen percent committed their
offenses against kids and adults. Kids today in this country are hidden victims, and
while we hope that these sex offenders are reintegrated into the community, that
they stay crime-free, the reality is that the worst thing we can do is to provide them
anonymity.
The worst thing that we can do is take someone out of prison and say, "Go forth
and sin no more," because even the ones that are well-intentioned, and again, all
sex offenders are not alike, I'm not trying to over-generalize, but even the ones that
are well-intentioned come back to the communities where they have access to kids
and women and they begin to fantasize, and these offenses reoccur. My point is,
we're not saying, "Lock them away forever." All of them don't need to be. We are
saying, in the interest of balance and reason, is it not rational and reasonable to say
that, at least in the most serious cases, we can provide the information of their
presence in the community to the people most likely to be affected by it?
I think that's what our debate's about. Our debate is about where you draw the
lines. And we believe that there is a compelling public interest for the state to do
more, to protect the most vulnerable section of our population, other than just
saying to high-risk offenders who've served their time, that we hope they don't do
it again, and if they do, we're going to do the best we can to catch them. Thanks.
WALTER PINCUS: Well, I just want to thank our two debaters for a lively and an
illuminating discussion of really a difficult problem. Personally, I want to thank the
American Criminal Law Review for putting this on, and for bringing the two of
them together. You've done a good job. Thank you very much.
PAUL KAPLAN: To those thanks, I would very briefly add my own. To you,
Professor Strossen, to you, Professor Allen, and of course, to our moderator, Walter
Pincus, for what I think has really been a truly provocative and very enlightening
debate today. As you know, the transcript of today's event will be published in the
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American Criminal Law Review summer issue, and we look forward to sharing
your views with the larger legal audience through that forum.
I'd be remiss if I did not also thank three people who really helped make today's
event possible. My deepest thanks to Monica Stearns from Georgetown's Office of
Journal Administration, and to the American Criminal Law Review's own Willie
Williams and Tiffany Olsen, and to all the members of their debate committee who
worked so hard on today's project.
Finally, I would like to invite everybody here to a reception, which will begin in
just a few moments on the twelfth floor of the Gewirz Student Center, as an
opportunity for you to meet today's participants, and to continue this dialogue with
them yourselves, one-on-one. This is an issue that has received a great deal of
discussion, not only on this campus, but in offices and courts and around kitchen
tables around the country. I'm sure that will continue and I hope you'll all avail
yourselves of the opportunity to participate in that debate with the experts that we
have with us here today. Thank you so much for joining us and have a great
evening.
Thank you.

